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COMMENTS
NON-DISCLOSURE OF COMPLAINANTS' NAMES
IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES: TITLE IV
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40, F.R.D. 391 (D.S.C. 1966)
Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' permits the Attorney General to
bring desegregation suits against local school boards "in the name of the
United States" provided, among other requirements,2 he believes the ag-
grieved persons cannot "initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceed-
ings." 3 Satisfied that the various requirements were met, the Attorney
General commenced this action against the Lexington County School
Board. The Board, stating it could not prepare its defense, posed numer-
ous interrogatories,' some of which the government refused to answer. The
contested questions sought the name or names of the complainants and
the nature of the complaint.5 The government based its refusal to answer
on subsection (b) of Title IV, which declares that a person is unable to
initiate and maintain appropriate proceedings ". . . whenever he [the
Attorney General] is satisfied that the institution of such litigation would
jeopardize the personal safety, employment, or economic standing of such
person or persons, their families, or their property."" This provision, the
government argued, was intended to protect the complainant by conceal-
ment, allowing suit to be brought in the name of the United States.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964).
2. The Act also requires that the Attorney General: I) receive a written complaint
signed by parents stating that their children are being denied the equal protection of the
laws, 2) believe the complaint is meritorious, 3) believe the action will "materially fur-
ther the orderly achievement of desegregation of public education," 4) notify the school
board of the complaint, 5) certify that he believes the school board has had a "reason-
able time to adjust the conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1964).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1964).
4. See FED. R. Cv. P. 33.
5. A third question challenged the basis upon which the Attorney General determined
the complainants' inability to initiate and maintain a suit. In sustaining the government's
refusal to answer, the court followed precedent. See United States v. Junction City
School Dist. No. 75, 253 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Ark. 1966). It would have been difficult
to draw a contrary conclusion because the House Judiciary Committee's Report states:
"It is not intended that the determination on which the certification was based should
be reviewable." 1964 (U.S.) CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(b) (1964).
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The court ordered the government to answer.7 Finding no reference to
reprisals in desegregation cases to date, the court reasoned that there was
no basis for the concealment provision of the statute. Earlier cases in-
volving non-disclosure were not directly in point. Moreover, the purpose
and scope of pre-trial discovery demanded that this information be made
available to the defendant school board.
The court's decision raises three problems: congressional intent, trouble-
some langauge in earlier cases, and the scope of discovery. In his address
to the Senate introducing the 1964 Civil Rights bill, the then Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey stated:
The bill requires the Attorney General to state in his complaint that
in his judgment the persons who complained are unable to initiate or
maintain appropriate legal proceedings. These statements by the At-
torney General will not be subject to challenge either by the defendants
or by the court. Under no circumstances will the Attorney General
be required to reveal the names of the particular complainants.8
This unequivocal language is the sole statement about the non-disclosure
provision. Congress accepted it without further debate. One federal court,
after considering this provision, said:
Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly expresses the legis-
lative intent that the Attorney General be vested with exclusive
and final determination of the sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, the
Attorney General need not detail the facts behind the certificate nor
disclose the names or identity of the person or persons complaining
to him. The legislative history of the Act leaves no doubt that such
was the contemplation of Congress.'
But in School Dist. No. 1, the court questioned the need for concealment.
Although it found no reprisals in desegragation cases, the court went on to
say that even if there were reprisals, the "United States court is now avail-
able for the protection of the complainants."1 What this precisely means
remains obscure. But the legislative intent to protect complainants from
disclosure is apparent. One need hardly be reminded of the violence in
connection with civil rights activities in Little Rock, Birmingham, Selma,
Montgomery, Grenada, Bogalusa. Conceding for the sake of argument,
however, that there have been no reprisals so far, and adequate "protection"
7. Such an order is authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
8. United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40 F.R.D. 391, 393 (D.S.C. 1966), citing 110
CoNG. REc. 6543 (1964) (emphasis added).
9. United States v. Junction City School Dist. No. 75, 253 F. Supp. 766, 768 (W.D.
Ark. 1966).
10. United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40 F.R.D. 391, 394 (D.S.C. 1966).
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may be available, the court still is second-guessing Congress and acting as
a super-legislature.
Two earlier cases, Natchez v. Special Separate School Dist. No. 112011
and United States v. Junction City School Dist. No. 75,12 both had lan-
guage suggesting that the identity of the complainants and the nature of
the complaint were immaterial to the "issues"' 3 or the "action""' and need
not be disclosed. But these cases were distinguished in the instant case on
the ground that they did not directly involve the issue of disclosure, so that
the conflict between liberal discovery and its implicit restriction in Title IV
was not considered in them. If the words "issues" or "action" referred only
to the issues presented through that stage of the trial, then the distinction
drawn in School Dist. No. 1 would be meaningful. The identity of the
complainants would not be necessary when deciding a motion to dismiss-
the motion dealt with in both the Natchez and Junction City cases. How-
ever, those courts might have been referring to to the ultimate issues to be
presented in the cases, meaning that identities would never have to be
revealed.
In refusing to give effect to the federal act, the court in School Dist.
No. 1 considered the scope of discovery but stopped its inquiry without
fully exploring exceptions to discovery. Unquestionably the purpose of
the Federal Rules 26-37 is full disclosure of any relevant information other
than privileged information or work product. 5 The defendant's question
seeking the identity of the signers and the nature of the complaint could not
be termed irrelevant. It then must be decided whether the information fits
one of the exceptions, privilege or work product. The latter simply is not
applicable here. But there are numerous forms of privilege, one of which,
informer's privilege, should be carefully considered. This privilege is well
11. Unpublished report cited and quoted in United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40
F.R.D. 391, 394 n.6 (D.S.C. 1966).
12. 253 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Ark. 1966).
13. Unpublished report cited and quoted in United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40
F.R.D. 391, 394 n.6 (D.S.C. 1966).
14. United States v. Junction City School Dist. No. 75, 253 F. Supp. 766, 768 (W.D.
Ark. 1966).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37; 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 641 (Wright ed. 1961); 4 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.0211]
(1963); Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39 (1963). As Justice Douglas has stated, "Mod-
em instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose .... They together with pretrial
procedures make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with
the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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recognized in criminal cases,"6 and in civil cases as well. 7 It may be gen-
erally stated as "the government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with enforcement of that law."' 8
The court in School Dist. No. 1 stated: "No commentary has been
called to the attention of the court where the competing demands of the
federal rules have been considered, balanced against any need for secrecy,
and denied."' 9 This must be true. The fact is, however, that such cases
do exist.
Arguably, the "informer" in desegregation cases is substantially like the
informer in an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.2" In these cases, after an employee complains to the Department of
Labor about a violation of the Act, the Secretary is authorized to bring
suit in his own name.2 After suits have commenced, employers, as part
of the discovery process, have sought the names of the employees who
complained. The Secretary has successfully raised the privilege to protect
the informers' names.22 In Wirtz v. Continental Finance & Loan Co.,2" the
court reasoned that employees are "particularly susceptible to the fear of
retaliation," so that to obtain the information needed to insure compliance
with the Act, the government must assure informers that their names would
not be divulged. Summarizing the factors to be considered concerning
informer's privilege, the court stated:
This privilege may be invoked where a balancing of conflicting policy
considerations shows that the public interest in protecting the flow
of information outweighs the individual's rights to prepare his defense.
If this type of weighing of conveniences is warranted in an action
where the defendant may be subject to criminal penalties, it goes with-
out saying that it is appropriate where only civil remedies are sought. 4
16. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354,
340 P.2d 594 (1959). For a full review of the cases, see Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262
(1961).
17. 2A W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, supra note 15, § 651.1; 4 J. Moom, supra note
15, ff 26.25 [6.-2].
18. 2A W. BAREON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 15, § 651.1.
19. United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40 F.R.D. 391, 395 (D.S.C. 1966) (emphasis
added).
20. §§ 1-19, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060-69, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
22. Wirtz v. Continental Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964); Wirtz v.
B.A.C. Steel Prod., Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633
(3d Cir. 1959); Mitchell v. Neylon, 27 F.R.D. 438 (D. Neb. 1960). Contra, Fleming v.
Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
23. 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964).
24. Id.
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This balancing principle is not confined to Fair Labor Standards cases.
When defendants have sought to discover the names of persons who com-
plained to the government about civil anti-trust violations, courts have
sustained the government's refusal to answer interrogatories on grounds of
privilege. 5 As one court stated: "The principle involved was the protection
from disclosure of the identity of informers to the Government of viola-
tions of statutes designed to prevent public wrong.... In an extraordinary
case, perhaps, this principle may have to yield to the requirements of pre-
trial discovery or compulsory disclosure... but this is hardly such a case."2 8
Because the court in School Dist. No. I does not discuss the facts of the
case or consider the possibility of privilege, one cannot say whether School
Dist. No. 1 is such an extraordinary case.
Privilege, an exception to pre-trial discovery, has two exceptions itself.
First, if the names of the complainants are already known or have been
revealed through disclosure of other facts, there is no reason for granting
the privilege. Second, if the names are going to be revealed at the trial
or the complainants will appear to testify, the information must be made
available during discovery.2" It is possible that in such a case the govern-
ment would use the complainants at trial, so that the names would not be
privileged. If the government insisted on the privilege, but later tried to
present the complainants, the court might either refuse to allow them to
testify or grant the defendants sufficient time for discovery, i.e., delay the
trial.29 However, it may be just as possible for the government to refrain
from any use of the complainants at the trial. It is submitted that the
court should have recognized the possibility of a privilege, inquired into
the possible use of the informers at trial, then weighed the considerations
on each side before reaching its decision. The court says that privilege
from discovery is recognized only to the extent that the material is privi-
leged at trial. This is true, but informer's privilege is recognized at trial."0
25. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950), aff'd,
342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949). See
also Cardox Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 23 F.R.D. 27 (S.D. Ill. 1958)
(patent infringement); United States v. Matles, 19 F.R.D. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (nat-
uralization cancellation).
26. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950), aff'd,
342 U.S. 143 (1951).
27. Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); 4 J. MooRE, supra note 15,
26.25 [6.-2].
28. Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); 4 J.
Mooitz, supra note 15, 26.25 [6.-2].
29. See United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
30. UNIFORm RULES OF EvIDEmcz 36; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE § 148 (1954); 8 J.
WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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Wigmore states "that the government has [informer's] privilege is well es-
tablished, and its soundness cannot be questioned."'"
The court rebuffs the government's assertion that the defendant did not
require this information for its defense, saying that it "does not, unfor-
tunately, possess such welcome powers of clairvoyance. In that lack the
quiet voice of common sense warns that fair play may suffer if the wolf
is to say what is best for the lamb."32 One cannot assume the bad faith of
a defendant in asserting need for the information-even in a desegregation
suit aimed at a dual school system. The preparation of a case may vary
depending on the type of discrimination or segregation charged: dual
school systems, segregated schools within one system, or segregated class-
rooms within one school building. If a court doubts a defendant's asser-
tion of need, it seems reasonable to inquire into this need in the same way
the court might probe plaintiff's claim of privilege.
The government has decided to answer the interrogatories as ordered
by the court rather than suffer dismissal and appeal.3" There may be sev-
eral reasons for this course of action: the government may not have feared
reprisals in this locality, it may have decided that it must use the com-
plainants at the trial, it may not have wished to delay this suit unless ab-
solutely necessary. These are all matters of strategy whose importance is
restricted to this particular case. They do not necessarily indicate any
policy to be followed by the government in future cases.
It is possible that, based on its experience to date, the government does
not feel that it needs to rely on concealment in these cases. But it appears
there will be many more desegregation cases. David Seely, Assistant United
States Commissioner for Education, recently said of the Deep South's3' at-
titute toward school desegregation: "They are trying to get away with as
little as possible."3 He estimated that more than 95 per cent of the Negro
students in the Deep South still attend all-Negro schools." Against this
background and against the background of violence which seems endemic
to civil rights problems, Congress deemed the non-disclosure device nec-
essary.
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2374.
32. United States v. School Dist. No. 1, 40 F.R.D. 391, 394 (D.S.C. 1966).
33. Letter from Terrell L. Glenn, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
South Carolina, to the Washington University Law Quarterly, Nov. 21, 1966.
34. "Deep South" refers to five states: South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and Louisiana. Nelson, Civil Rights Law Enforcement Problems Remain in 5
States, St. Louis Globe Democrat, Nov. 24, 1966, at 20G, col. 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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